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Can a many-valued language functionally
represent its own semantics?
Jeffrey Ketland
Intuitively, Tarski’s Indefinability Theorem (Tarski 1935/6, Theorem I) says
that no sufficiently rich language can represent its own semantics. The
semantics of such a language must be described in an ‘essentially richer’
meta-language. Concerning the philosophical significance of Tarski’s
Theorem, Bell and Machover comment,
An argument like the one used in the proof of Thm. 4.7 can be applied
in a wide variety of cases. … This suggests that there cannot exist a
formal language which – under some ‘standard’ interpretation – could
adequately serve as its own metalanguage; for the syntax and seman-
tics of a formal language cannot be adequately expressed within the
language itself. In particular, the dream of certain philosophers, that
some day a precise formal language will be constructed in which all
scientific notions and theories would be expressible, is most probably
unrealizable. (Bell and Machover 1974: 330–31).
The proof of Tarski’s Theorem is based on the construction of a self-
referential sentence, akin to the traditional Liar sentence.1 Although there
is still no consensus concerning the resolution of the Liar and related
semantic paradoxes, one group of approaches involves various systems of
Many-Valued Logic (MVL). In particular, one may construct fixed-point
languages, as pioneered by Kripke 1975 and Martin & Woodruff 1975.2
For such a fixed point language, where T is the truth predicate symbol, 
the extension (say, E) of T is exactly the set of truths in the language con-
taining T. This guarantees, for example, that where j is a sentence, then 
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1 Suppose that the language contains a function symbol diag(.) representing the diago-
nal function, where the diagonalization of a formula j(x) with just the variable x free
is the result of substituting the quotation of j for any free occurrence of x in j(x).
The diagonalization of j(x) is thus j(Èj(x)˘). The Liar sentence l is constructed by
diagonalizing the formula ÿT(diag(x)). (Compare this with the Gödel formula G for
an axiomatic mathematical theory S. This formula G is constructed by diagonalizing
the formula ÿProvs(diag(x)), where Provs(x) is a formula representing provability in
S.) So, l has the explicit form ÿT(diag(ÈÿT(diag(x))˘)).
2 For more recent work, see Visser 1984 for the extension to 4-valued semantics, and
Leitgeb 1999 for a general treatment in terms of de Morgan-valued models. For a
valuable discussion of the main properties of fixed point theories of truth, see Gupta
and Belnap 1993.
ANAL436  7/21/2003  1:53 PM  Page 292
can a many-valued language represent its own semantics? 293
j Œ E iff T(Èj˘) Œ E. In this sense, the resulting interpreted language ‘rep-
resents its own semantics’.3
Here, I wish to argue that, in another quite reasonable sense, such 
languages do not represent their own semantics. The idea is that the 
semantics for a many-valued language is defined (in the informal, ‘exter-
nal’, mathematical metalanguage) using a certain semantic valuation func-
tion, written ||.||, which assigns ‘truth degrees’ to formulae of the language.
For such a many-valued language to represent its own semantics properly,
I propose that the language should contain not merely a truth predicate,
but a function symbol, say n, which denotes the semantic valuation func-
tion ||.||. Then, by a modification of Tarski’s Theorem, we show that this
condition cannot be satisfied (modulo a certain caveat: the language must
be able to discriminate the truth degrees).
MVL introduces a domain of possible ‘truth values’ or ‘truth degrees’,
beyond the familiar classical truth values {, ^}. An interpreted MV-
language L can be modelled as a pair (L, M) where L is a (usually, first-
order) language and M is an MV-model for L.4 Let’s use the notation ||j||M
to mean the truth degree of an L-sentence j in the interpreted language 
(L, M). For a classical language, the semantic value ||j||M is either  or ^.
In particular, the MV-model M determines:
(a) A term valuation function, (.)M,s: Term(L) Æ D, which assigns to
each L-term a value in the domain D (relative to some assignment
s).
(b) A formula valuation function, ||.||M,s: Form(L) Æ DW, which
assigns to each L-formula a truth degree from DW (relative to
some assignment s).
As is well known, many-valued approaches to the semantic paradoxes
are prone to the Revenge Problem (see, e.g. Haack 1978: 147–48). For
example, consider the strengthened Liar sentence l, equivalent to ‘l is not
true’. On a many-valued approach, assuming a primitive truth predicate T,
such a sentence l may be constructed, and is assigned some non-standard
truth degree d, perhaps u (meaning ‘neither-true-nor-false’) or b (meaning
‘both-true-and-false’). In general, the Liar sentence receives some truth
3 As Martin & Woodruff (1975) put it, we have represented ‘true-in-L’ in L.
4 An MV-model M for L can be represented as a quadruple (W, TF, D, ) where W is
an algebraic structure of the form (DW, , ̂ , ~, Ÿ, ⁄) satisfying certain conditions (the
precise conditions are not too important for what follows), TF is a filter in W (also
known as the set of designated values) and  is an L-interpretation (with domain D)
assigning characteristic functions to the primitive predicate and function symbols of
L. See Gupta and Belnap 1993 or Leitgeb 1999 for more details about the metathe-
ory for many-valued semantics.
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degree d such that ~d = d.5 In any case, it seems that what l ‘says’ is the
case. For if the truth degree of l is d, then surely l is not true simpliciter:
its degree certainly isn’t . So, the reasoning goes, since l expresses a true
proposition, the degree of l should be . But this leads to contradiction.
One might, and indeed I think should, conclude from this that the relevant
proposition (that the truth degree of l is not ) is not expressed by this
sentence l. And the underlying reason for l’s failure to express this propo-
sition is that the semantic concept ‘the truth degree [semantic value] of …’
is not definable in the language.
The point is general. No matter how we squeeze and tug the carpet,
certain semantic concepts which are well defined in the informal metalan-
guage description of the fixed-point MV-language are inexpressible within
the very MV-language in question. This point is not original. Kripke
remarked, having described his fixed-point theory of truth, that
… the necessity to ascend to a metalanguage may be one of the weak-
nesses of the present theory. The ghost of the Tarski hierarchy is still
with us. (Kripke 1975: 74)
The concepts we use to describe fixed-point languages are expressed in
some informal metalanguage, and there is no guarantee that they can be
defined inside the language under discussion. And in general the Revenge
Problem (i.e. the appropriate use of Tarski’s Indefinability Theorem) shows
that they can’t. The metalanguage is richer than the object language. Gupta
and Belnap make a similar point:
Irrespective of whether we consider classical or non-classical schemes,
then, only logically incomplete schemes have the fixed point property
… It can be shown that there are related semantical notions that 
these [fixed-point] languages cannot contain. … All these claims of
indefinability, and others like them, can be established by means of
variants of the Liar paradox. (Gupta and Belnap 1993: 95)
Here, I wish to try and analyse more carefully how Tarski’s Indefinabil-
ity Theorem reappears in connection with MVL approaches to the seman-
tic paradoxes. The simple result below does not turn on details of the MVL
in question. However, it does turn crucially on the bivalence of identity
claims about the truth degrees themselves. Suppose that we treat the iden-
tity predicate = as bivalent. If t and u are terms denoting the same object,
5 The fixed point condition forces l to have the same truth degree as its negation. 
For the Liar construction entails that l has the same truth degree as ÿT(Èl˘). And the
fixed point condition requires that l has the same truth degree as T(Èl˘). Thus, l
has the same value as ÿl. If d is the truth degree of l and ~ is the semantic operation
which interprets the negation symbol ÿ, then d = ~d. Classical bivalent semantics
obviously lacks such a truth degree.
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the equation t = u is true (); if they denote distinct objects, then the equa-
tion is false (^). In symbols, ||t = u||M =  if tM = uM, and ||t = u||M = ^ if 
tM π uM.
For the following argument, our interpreted language must be ‘suffi-
ciently rich’, which involves three conditions. First, it must represent its
own syntax; second, there must be some mechanism of self-reference; 
and third, it must represent its own truth domain. We shall say first that an
interpreted MV-language L = (L, M) represents its own syntax just in case
(a) every expression of L is an element of the domain D, and (b) for each
expression e in L, there is a term t (written Èe˘) such that tM = e, and (c) the
sets of variables, constants, terms, atomic formulae, formulae, etc., in L
are definable in L (there exist L-formulae whose extensions in the 
appropriate MV sense are precisely these sets). Second, we require the 
presence of self-reference. We say that an interpreted language L has 
self-reference just in case for any L-formula j with just x free, there is an
L-term t such that tM = j(t).
Third, a suitably rich MV-language can also talk about the truth degrees
themselves. It is prima facie clear that fixed-point languages can be con-
structed with the property that the underlying structure W of truth degrees
exists as a substructure of the model (D, ). For example, the language may
contain constants for each truth degree of the structure W, and a relation
symbol < expressing its ordering properties (or function symbols defining
the operations ~, Ÿ and ⁄ on the truth degrees). The reason one can do this
consistently is rather trivial. Unless one explicitly says so, the language
doesn’t ‘know’ that certain elements of its domain (i.e. the elements of the
truth domain) are also being used as truth degrees. It simply treats them as
elements of its domain D. So, we say that an MV-language L represents its
own truth domain just in case DW Õ D and for each truth degree a Œ DW,
there is a unique constant a such that aM = a.6
Using the bivalence property of identity, we can now show that it is
impossible to define within a sufficiently rich MV-language L = (L, M) a
function symbol n which denotes in L the ‘external’ formula valuation
function ||.||M.
Definition: A 1-place function symbol n in L represents the valuation
function ||.||M in an MV-language L = (L, M) just in case, for every L-
sentence j, we have
6 E.g. the truth degree  is denoted by the constant . The condition that all truth
degrees have names is obviously rather strong if the truth domain is the compact inter-
val [0, 1], as used in fuzzy logic. But we do not appeal to any such strength below.
Also, we do not require that the operations on truth degree are represented. That is,
we do not demand that there exist in L function symbols ~, Ÿ, ⁄ which represent the
corresponding truth-functional operations on the truth degrees.
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(*) n(Èj ˘)M = ||j||M.
If such a function symbol n exists, we say that L represents its own
formula valuation function.
This constraint is strong. For with such a function symbol, one can define
a specific semantic concept for each truth degree a that is named in the 
language: put Sa(x) for n(x) = a. So, T(x) is just n(x) =  and F(x) is just
n(x) = ^. Furthermore, as long as the truth degrees are distinguishable
(identity is bivalent), no sufficiently rich MV-language can represent its
own formula valuation function:
Theorem: Let L be a MV-language with truth degree , and which rep-
resents its own syntax, has self-reference and in which identity is bivalent.
Suppose also that L represents its own truth domain. Then L does not rep-
resent its own formula valuation function ||.||.
Proof: This is modification of Tarski’s Theorem. For a reductio, assume
that L represents its own formula valuation function. That is, there is a
function symbol n which represents ||.||. By self-reference, we construct a
formula l of the form (n(t) π ), where the term t denotes l. In particular,
||l|| = ||n(Èl˘) π ||. First, suppose that ||l|| = . Then, ||n(Èl˘) π || = . 
So, n(Èl˘)M π . So, using (*), ||l|| π . Contradiction. Instead, suppose 
that ||l|| π . By (*), n(Èl˘)M π . Hence, because the truth domain is 
represented, ||n(Èl˘) π || = . Hence, ||l|| = . Contradiction. QED.
Of course, we can coherently define the semantics of many valued lan-
guages. Working in our informal mathematical metalanguage, we may
coherently define an interpreted MV-language L, and define the formula
valuation function ||.||, which assigns a truth degree to each formula. Also,
because of the various fixed point theorems, we are also able to construct
MV-languages which do represent their own semantics in the sense that the
extension of some predicate (the truth predicate) coincides with the sen-
tences assigned the value  by ||.||. Many-valued logic is interesting, valu-
able and so on. But many-valued logic doesn’t resolve the Liar paradox. In
our informal metalanguage, we assume that we are able to reason con-
cerning the possible truth degrees. In particular, the truth degrees are (onto-
logically) distinct. For example, our description assumes that the degree 
is different from the degrees u, ̂ , etc. If L is such a language, satisfying con-
ditions of ‘sufficient richness’, and can properly discriminate amongst its
own truth degrees, then the semantic notion ‘the truth degree of j in L’ is
not definable inside L.7
7 Hannes Leitgeb (personal communication) has pointed out to me that if the bivalence
condition on the identity predicate is relaxed, then fixed-point languages can be con-
structed again. One needs to treat certain identities amongst the truth degrees as not
having a standard truth degree. For example, consider a 3-valued semantics with
truth degrees {, ^, u} with the strong Kleene truth tables. Suppose that an identity 
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t = u is assigned the value u (‘undefined’) when either tM or uM is u and assigned either
 or ^, as the case may be, when the terms denote objects distinct from u. Then the
resulting Kripke jump operator J (which in our case maps the function f which the
function symbol n denotes to a new function, J(f )) is monotonic, and it follows that
there are fixed points.
Why the Converse Consequence Condition cannot
be accepted
Luca Moretti
Three general confirmation principles discussed by Hempel (1965) are the
following:
Converse Consequence Condition (CCC) If an observation statement
E confirms a hypothesis H and if another hypothesis H* entails H,
then E confirms H*.
Special Consequence Condition (SCC) If an observation statement 
E confirms a hypothesis H, then E confirms any of H’s logical 
consequences.
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